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THE PROSPECTS FOR A NORTH AMERICAN SECURITY
PERIMETER:
Coordinationand Harmonizationof United States and Canadian
ImmigrationandRefugee Laws
Steve de Eyret

PART I: INTRODUCTION
Throughout the twentieth century, the border between Canada and the
United States of America was commonly referred to, with great pride, as the
world's longest undefended border. After September 11, 2001, the term undefended quickly became a dirty word in Ottawa and Washington, as the
Americans began to view their northern border as a vulnerability.' The September 11 attacks led to a profound increase in security measures and border
controls in the United States and, as a consequence, Canada. The initial response of the United States in the immediate aftermath of the attacks resulted
in extensive delays along the Canada-United States border. Realizing the
costs of such delays, leaders from both countries issued a joint "Smart Border" plan, which has acted as the blueprint for bilateral cooperation at the
border in the subsequent years. The reality of the effectiveness of border
controls, and debate over what should be the primary objective of such controls, has led to renewed discussion on the concept of a North American security perimeter. This plan would essentially eliminate barriers to the
movement of people and goods across the shared border, and focus instead
on enforcement and prevention at continental points of entry.
Moving towards a North American security perimeter would have far
reaching implications in numerous policy areas for Canada and the United
States, including security, law enforcement, trade and commerce, and immigration and refugee policies. Pursuing such a far-reaching plan would require significant political willpower by North American leaders, which has
yet to be espoused by politicians on either side of the border. Nevertheless,
t J.D., Case Western Reserve University School of Law, 2010; B.A. (Honours), Bishop's
University, 2005. I thank my wife Emily, my Mother, and my Uncle Paul for their support
over the past three years.
1 Peter Andreas, A Tale of Two Borders: The US. -Canadaand US-Mexico Lines After 911, in THE REBORDERING OF NORTH AMERICA: INTEGRATION AND EXCLUSION INA NEW
SECURITY CONTEXT 8 (Peter Andreas and Thomas J. Biersteker eds., Routledge 2003).
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ad-hoc agreements have been implemented in areas of defense, law enforcement, and immigration that have emphasized a continental approach to mutual problems. These binational agreements and institutions continue to grow
in size and scope, and serve as a realistic and effective alternative in lieu of a
formal security perimeter.
This note will discuss and compare the immigration and refugee policies
of Canada and the United States, identifying where diverging policies exist
that would require coordination or harmonization within a perimeter agreement. Part II of this note will begin with a discussion of the history and development of the North American security perimeter concept, including previous incremental efforts to this end, and the main contentions of proponents
and opponents of such a plan. Canadian and United States immigration and
refugee policies will then be analyzed, outlining the laws, policy objectives,
and structural framework of each country's immigration system. Part III will
analyze the legal issues raised through potential harmonization of the two
countries' immigration and refugee policies. The main areas where these
policies diverge will be highlighted, and the European Schengen Agreement
will be evaluated as a possible model for resolving these incongruities. Finally, related political and policy considerations that might preclude a
movement towards harmonization will be discussed.
PART H: FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. THE HISTORY OF NORTH AMERICAN PERIMETER
SECURITY AND DEFENSE
The general concept of North American perimeter security has existed in
varying forms for almost 200 years, tracing its roots back to United States
President James Monroe's 1823 unilateral declaration that "the American
continents . . . are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers."2 In 1938, under the threat of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, President Franklin Roosevelt and Prime Minister
William Lyon Mackenzie King formulated the principles that defined how
their two nations would address common security threats for the remainder of
the twentieth century.3 In a speech given at Queen's University in Kingston,
Ontario, Roosevelt declared that even the neutral American people "would
2 John J. Noble, FortressAmerica or FortressNorth America?, 11 LAW & Bus. REv. AM.
461, 462 (2005).
3 Stephen Clarkson, The View from the Attic: Toward a Gated ContinentalCommunity?,
in THE REBORDERING OF NORTH AMERICA: INTEGRATION AND EXCLUSION IN A NEW SECURITY

CONTEXT 70 (Peter Andreas and Thomas J. Biersteker eds., Routledge 2003).
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not stand idly by" if Canada was attacked.4 The Prime Minister responded
two days later with a declaration that "enemy forces should not be able to
pursue their way either by land, sea, or air to the United States across Canadian Territory." 5 Shortly after, in 1940, the Permanent Joint Board on Defense was established to serve as a binational advisory board on North American continental defense. 6 Later that decade, the principles espoused by President Roosevelt and Prime Minster King were enshrined in Article V of the
North Atlantic Treaty (NATO), vowing that "an armed attack against one or
more [NATO country] in Europe or North America shall be considered an
attack against them all." 7 The 1950s witnessed the signing of The North
American Aerospace Defense (NORAD) agreement between the United
States and Canada, creating a common perimeter around the two countries to
defend against the threat of a Soviet attack.8 These agreements, though short
of establishing a fully-integrated North American security perimeter, were
effective in addressing the security threats faced by North America in the
twentieth century.
In March 2001, largely in response to the arrest of Ahmed Ressam, 9 the
"millennium bomber," former United States Ambassador to Canada Gordon
Giffin boldly suggested that visionary steps must be taken to stem the flow of
terrorism and cross-border crime, and that a perimeter approach to border
management be considered.10 Shortly afterwards, the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks brought the issue of improving North American security to
the forefront, as the immediate United States response to the attacks had
grounded air traffic and brought land crossings to a virtual halt. Less than a
week after the attacks, former United States Ambassador to Canada Paul
Cellucci said that "if the United States had policies on immigration and refugee status that were more common we could establish this perimeter to protect the United States and Canada, and I think that is where [the United States
and Canada] should be headed.""

5 Id.
6 Department of National Defense (Can.), Backgrounder - The Permanent Joint Board
on
National Defense, availableat http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/news-nouvelles/view-newsafficher-nouvelles-eng.asp?id=298.
North Atlantic Treaty Art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243.
8 Noble, supra note 2.
9 See Sam Howe and Tim Weiner, Man Seized With Bomb PartsAt Border Spurs US.
Inquiry, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 18, 1999, at Al, availableat http://www.nytimes.com/1999/12/18/
us/man-seized-with-bomb-parts-at-border-spurs-us-inquiry.html.
to See Rethinking the Line: The Canada-USBorder,HORIZONS, Mar. 2000, at 5, available
at http://www.policyresearch.gc.ca/doclib/Final-v3_sunsetE.pdf.
"1 Ray Koslowski, Smart Borders, Virtual Borders or No Borders: HomelandSecurity
Choicesfor the UnitedStates and Canada, 11 LAw & Bus. REv. Am. 527, 540 (2005).
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On December 12, 2001, former Canadian Deputy Prime Minister John
Manley and former Department of Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge
met at the Detroit-Windsor Ambassador Bridge to sign the Smart Border
Declaration, a thirty-point binational action plan to revamp Canada-United
States border strategy in an effort to alleviate the post-September 11 congestion. The Declaration's thirty points were based on four pillars: (1) the secure flow of people; (2) the secure flow of goods; (3) secure infrastructure;
and (4) information sharing and coordination in the enforcement of these
objectives.12 Also in December 2001, the Canadian House of Commons
Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade recommended that the
government study the implications of establishing a security perimeter
around North America; however, the reply of Jean Chrdtien's government
was viewed as being "ambivalent," and the recommendation was avoided by
saying that the government was "committed to examining any options for
improving operation while providing appropriate security at the border."13
In addressing the potential for further North American security integration
though a perimeter agreement, several options have been identified. Professor St6phane Roussel presented four options in a 2002 paper prepared for the
Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies.14 The first, most comprehensive approach, is a "Formal Security Perimeter," a comprehensive treaty between
Canada and the United States, modeled after the European Union's Schengen
Agreement, the Permanent Joint Board of Defense, and the International
Joint Commission. 5 The second option is an "Informal/Limited Security
Perimeter," a sectoral memorandum of understanding between agencies
without a formal treaty.16 Roussel views this as the most likely scenario as it
is the way in which most Canada-United States relations are currently conducted, as evidenced by the Smart Border Declaration. The third option is a
"Multilateral Security Perimeter," which would encompass Mexico and possible additional nations, and could be either a formal or informal agreement.17 The final option is a "Unilateral Approach," with each country establishing its own security protocols, which, at least in the case of Canada,
would have to be robust enough to reassure the United States.'8 To an extent,
Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Specifics of Secure and Smart Border
Action Plan (Jan. 7, 2002), availableat http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press-release
0036.shtm [hereinafter Smart Border Action Declaration].
13 Noble, supra note 2, at 464.
14 St6phane Roussel, The Blueprintfor FortressNorth America, in FORTRESS NORTH
12

AMERICA? WHAT CONTINENTAL SECURITY MEANS FOR CANADA, 16-19 (Nicholas Furneaux &

David Rudd, eds., 2002).
15 Id.
16
17
18

Id.
Id.
Id.
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this is an approach also being taken by the Canadian Government through the
immigration and security reforms implemented after September 11.
Roussel's first option, a "Formal Security Perimeter," was further advocated in January 2003 by the Canadian Counsel of Chief Executives (CCCE)
through its North American Security and Prosperity Initiative. The report
advocated the need to "transform the internal border into a shared checkpoint
within the Canada-United States economic space" with a twofold objective
of "shift[ing] the burden of protecting our countries against global threats
away from the internal border to the approaches to North America, and to
eliminate unnecessary regulatory, procedural, and infrastructural barriers at
our internal border." 9 Such an ambitious plan would require extensive harmonization of Canadian and United States policies in numerous areas, not the
least of which would be immigration and refugee policies.
B. IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICES OF CANADA AND
THE UNITED STATES
Immigration was the cornerstone of development in Canada and the United States. Both countries are multicultural societies with immigration policies that are among the most liberal in the world. 20 In general, these immigration policies have sought to enhance and expand populations, geographical frontiers, and labor markets; reunite families; protect the prosecuted and
displaced; and permit temporary workers to supplement labor shortages.2'
The policies differ when examining the overall social and economic priorities
each country seeks to advance through the administration of their immigration and refugee policies.
Canada's immigration policy is focused on attracting young, highly
skilled immigrants through an emphasis on skills and education.2 2 In 2008,
63.9% of all immigrants to Canada were economic immigrants, while only
22.5% were family class immigrants.23 Canadian economic immigrants are
chosen through a point system that selects immigrants based on their age,

19 Canadian Council of Chief Executives, Reinventing Borders, Jan. 2003,
http://www.ceocouncil.ca/en/north/reinventing.php (last visited Sept. 1, 2010).
20

ROBERT PASTOR, TOWARD A NORTH AMERICAN COMMUNITY: LESSON FROM THE OLD

WORLD FOR THE NEW 122 (Inst. for Int'l Econ. 2001).

21 Peter Rekai, US and CanadianImmigration Policies:Marching Together to Different
Tunes, THE BORDER PAPERS, C.D. HOWE INSTITUTE COMMENTARY, No. 171, Nov. 2002, at 2,
availableat http://www.cdhowe.org/pdf/rekai.pdf
22 See Barry Newman, Northern View: In Canada,the Point oflimmigrationIs Mostly
Unsentimental, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 1999, at Al.
23 Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Facts and Figures 2008-Immigration Overview:
Permanent and Temporary Residents, http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/
statistics/facts2008/permanent/l.asp (last visited Sept. 1, 2010) [hereinafter CIC|.
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education, language, occupation, and experience.24 Conversely, United
States immigration policy is centered strongly around family reunification.2 5
In 2008, family class immigrants totaled 64.7% of all new permanent residents admitted to the United States, while only 15% were admitted based on
"employment based preferences."26

TABLE 1:
Permanent Resident Immigration, 200827
UNITED
IMMIGRANT
STATES
CLASS
Family

26.5%

64.7%

Economic

60.3%

15%

Refugee

8.8%

15%

Though some observers predicted that these divergent policies would
begin to converge in the 2000s, 2 8 the immigration statistics from the past five
years have not supported these predictions. 29 One possible explanation for
this is that United States legislators are weary of having to defend a Canadian-style "designer immigration" system that goes against the frontier image
of the "huddled masses" embraced by Lady Liberty. 30 Both systems, however, have their flaws: while the United States system is at times accused of
creating an overworked and undereducated immigrant class, the Canadian
System is criticized for resulting in an overeducated and underemployed
class.
This section will discuss the history and sources of both Canadian and
United States immigration and refugee law, and will then analyze how incongruity in these policies would have to be resolved in a security perimeter
agreement.

24 Newman, supranote 22.
25 Rekai, supra note
21.
26 U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Annual Flow Report, U.S. Legal PermanentResidents:
2008, Table 2, availableat http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/
lpr fr 2008.pdf [hereinafter DHSJ.
2 CIC, supranote 23; DHS, supra note 26.
28
29

See PASTOR, supra note 20.

CIC, supranote 23; DHS, supra note 26.

30 Rekai, supra note 21.
31

m~
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1. History and Sources of Canadian Immigration and Refugee Law
The two documents of the Canadian Constitution, the British North
America Act of 186732 and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
(Charter)33 together provide the basis for immigration and refugee law in
Canada, and the federal/provincial division of power. Overall, the federal
government enjoys supremacy on migration issues. Section 91 of the British
North America Act, which sets out the powers of the federal Parliament,
states that "naturalization and aliens" fall under the control of Parliament.3 4
However, section 95, Agriculture and Immigration, creates a sphere of concurrent federal/provincial jurisdiction: the provincial legislatures may regulate "immigration into the province," while the federal parliament may enact
legislation in relation "to [i]mmigration into all or any of the Provinces."
However, under the doctrine of paramountcy, federal laws take precedence
over an inconsistent provincial law, which means that provincial immigration
statutes will only be valid so long as they are "not repugnant to any Act of
the Parliament of Canada."37
The Charter, enacted in 1982, enshrined the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals in Canada. Notably, most Charter rights do not distinguish between citizens and non-citizens, rather referring to "everyone" or
"every individual." The exceptions to this are when dealing with democratic
(voting) rights38 and mobility (residence) rights.39 Section 7 of the Charter
grants "[e]veryone . .. the right to life, liberty, and security of the person and
the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles
of fundamental justice.""0 In 1985, applying Section 7 of the Charter to the
rights of a refugee claimant, the Canadian Supreme Court held in Singh v.
Canada that the Immigration Act was inconsistent with the Charter as it "did
not accord the appellants an adequate opportunity to present their case and to
know the case that had to be met."41 Most notably in this interpretation, the

32 Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. Ch. 3 (U.K.), as reprintedin R.S.C.,
No. 5 (Appendix 1985).
33 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act of 1982, ch. 11
(U.K.) [hereinafter Charter].
34 Constitution Act, supra note 3232, § 91, cl. 25.
3s Id. § 95.
36 MARTIN JONES & SASHA BAGLAY, REFUGEE LAw 32 (Irwin Law 2007).
37 Id.
38 Charter, supra note 33, § 3.

Id. § 6.
Id. § 7.
Singh v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration), [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177 (Can.);
JONES, supra note 36, at 38.
40
41
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Court held that "everyone," as used in Section 7, includes illegal immigrants
to Canada.42
In 2001, the Canadian government enacted the Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act 3 ("IRPA"), which was the first complete revision of Canadian immigration and refugee legislation in almost a quarter-century." The
IRPA is "framework legislation," thus it has since been complimented by
vast volumes of regulations including definitions, procedures, and decision
making factors.
2. History and Sources of United States Immigration and Refugee Law
Article I, Section 8, Clause 4 of the United States Constitution empowers
Congress to "establish an uniform rule of naturalization." 45 In the 1849 Passenger Cases, the United States Supreme Court held that the regulation of
immigration was a power of the federal government, and not the states.46
The Supreme Court views control over the nation's borders as an implicit
federal power, essential to the establishment and preservation of national
sovereignty. 47 While there is no express language vesting the power to regulate immigration or citizenship in either the Congress or the Executive
Branch, the United States Supreme Court has held that "over no conceivable
subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over the
admission of aliens."48
In 1952, Congress first compiled all of the existing, ad-hoc immigration
laws into a single statute, the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
(INA). 4 9 The aim of this original act was to combine quality control exclusions with a race-based national origins quota.o The INA remains the basic
statute for current United States immigration, although Congress has enacted
numerous significant amendments to the Act. In 1965, the controversial national origin quotas were removed and replaced with per-country quotas, and
the preference for family members of United States citizens was made a priority in the immigrant selection system." The Immigration Act of 1990 increased legal immigration quotas by thirty-five percent, permitting more
family sponsored immigration and encouraging employment-based immigra42

PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 1067 (Carswell, 4th ed., 1997).

43

Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, 2001 S.C., ch. 27 (Can.) [hereinafter IRPA].
JONES, supra note 36, at 42.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849).
Stephen W. Yale-Loehr, BASIC IMMIGRATION LAW 7 (Prac. L. Inst. 2007).
Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977).
See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (1952).

4

45
46

47
48
49

so
S1

Yale-Loehr, supra note 47.

Id
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tion.52 After September 11, Congress enacted the USA PATRIOT Act,
which toughened security clearances and background checks for both
nonimmigrant and immigrant classes, and increased the government's ability
to track foreign nationals in the United States." Most immigration functions
were moved from the Department of Justice to the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), with the immigration functions at DHS now spread among
three bureaus: United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS),
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and Customs and Border Protection (CBP).
PART IIH: LEGAL DISCUSSION
A. DIVERGING POLICIES TO BE ADDRESSED
1. Refugee and Asylum Policies
The main issue of contention when comparing United States and Canadian refugee and asylum policies is the argument of some United States observers that Canada is "soft" on refugees and asylees, which creates a haven
or "launching pad" for terrorists. 5 4 The events of September 11 further amplified this criticism, bringing claims that Canada's refugee determination
system is "out of step with what appears to be a convergence of policies and
practices in the developed world," and that it is "the most generous refugee
system in the world."" While several limited incidents may give some credence to these assertions, it is important to note that both the Canadian and
United States systems produce outcomes with similar results: Canada has a
forty-one percent refugee acceptance rate; the United States accepts thirtyseven percent. Nevertheless, several aspects of Canadian refugee policy are
frequently lambasted by critics on both sides of the border: the high rates of
approval, a generous social welfare system, infrequent prosecution, and lax
deportation procedures."

52

Id.

53

id.

Christopher Rudolph, InternationalMigration and Homeland Security: Coordination
and Collaborationin North America, 11 LAW & Bus. REv. AM. 433,444 (2005).
5 Id
56 Noble, supra note 2, at 510 (stating that "[A] former American Immigration official at
the April 1-2 [2005] Conference pointed out that the U.S. rate is much higher: when the stage
two acceptances are included, it is about 60 percent.").
s7 Rudolph, supra note 54.
5
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Both nations have a multi-tiered adjudication process for refugee claimants which are hindered by delays and bureaucracy.5 8 However, one source
of contention is the Canadian government's ability to track claimants after
they have landed. 9 Approximately twenty to thirty thousand refugees enter
Canada each year,60 and unlike the United States (and most other Western
nations), Canada does not detain refugee claimants until their status can be
determined.6 ' Under Canadian law, refugees who are not detained are allowed to move freely until their court appearance, and thousands never show
up for their court appearances. 62 Canadian law does permit interim detention
of claimants who are considered threats to the public or flight risks, but due
to a lack of resources and detention facilities, few detention orders are given. 63
A major difference between the status of refugees in Canada and the
United States is the access to social entitlement programs or employment
while their cases are pending. In Canada, there are very few barriers to
working or receiving government benefits while claims are pending," and
the Canadian Supreme Court has held that "every alien, regardless of origin,
personal history or criminal record, once having set foot on Canadian soil has
the right under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to claim refugee status. Having done so, the claimant has all the privileges of citizenship
Conversely, in the United States, Congress
except the right to vote."6
amended the INA in 1996 to allow refugees to be detained while their claims
are pending adjudication, and to bar them from working for at least six
months after making their claim.66 The amendment also created an "expedited removal" system to allow for the detention and/or removal of claimants
who do not have proper documentation.6 7
In the minds of many United States security officials and policy makers,
Canada's perceived softness on refugee claimants has created conditions
conducive for the infiltration of foreign terrorists. The Canadian Security
Intelligence Service (CSIS) has confirmed the presence of over fifty terrorist
58

Rekai, supra note 21, at 13.

CIC, supra note 23.
61 Athanasios Hristoulas, TradingPlaces: Canada,Mexico, and North American Security,
60

in THE REBORDERING OF NORTH AMERICA: INTEGRATION AND EXCLUSION IN ANEW SECURITY

CONTEXT 24, 30 (Peter Andreas and Thomas J. Biersteker eds., Routledge 2003).
id.
63 Rekai, supra note 21, at 13.

62

6 Rudolph, supra note 54.
65 Singh, 1 S.C.R. 177.
66 Rudolph, supra note 54, at 444-445; Illegal Immigration Reform & Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
67

ido

68

Rudolph, supra note 54, at 445.
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organizations operating in Canada, including Hezbollah, Hamas, al Qaeda,
and the Irish Republican Army. 69 A study by the United States Library of
Congress designated Canada as a nation "hospitable to organized crime and
terrorism," citing a 1999 CSIS report entitled Exploitation of Canada'sImmigration System: An Overview of Security Intelligence Concerns, which
stated that "terrorists appear to use Canadian residence as a safe haven, a
means to raise funds, to plan or support overseas activities or as a way to
obtain Canadian travel documents which make global travel easier." 70
After September 11, Canada adopted policies to tighten their refugee
claimant process through the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act,7 1
which made it more difficult for terrorists and international criminals to gain
entry to or stay in Canada. Reforms implemented in the Act include immediate screening by CSIS upon arrival in Canada; the establishment of nine
factors, including misrepresentation of identity and connections with a terrorist or criminal group, as grounds for denial of entry into Canada; greater penalties for immigration offenses; limits on the appeal rights of claimants identified for deportation for criminal offenses; and increased authority to arrest
foreign nationals suspected of terrorism. 72 Nevertheless, while security has
been given increased importance in the administration of refugee law, the
primary objective remains "upholding Canada's liberal humanitarian tradition, including protection for refugees and for those fleeing persecution requiring asylum."7 3 This was noted in the Library of Congress study, lamenting that "the 2002 bill designed to make Canada's immigration laws less
favorable to terrorists and international criminals is entitled the Immigration
and Refugee ProtectionAct [which] serves as an indication of the prevailing
concern for or priority placed upon civil liberties in Canada." 74
In July 2002, the governments of Canada and the United States signed a
Safe Third-Country Agreement, which came into effect on December 29,
2004." Under the Agreement, refugee claimants must make a claim in the
first country they arrive in unless they qualify for an exception to the Agreement. The stated objectives of the Agreement are to "enhance the orderly
handling of refugee claims, strengthen public confidence in the integrity of
our respective refugee systems, help reduce abuse of both countries' asylum
id
Library of Congress, NationsHospitable to Organized Crime and Terrorism, 147, Oct.
2003, availableat http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/NatsHospitable.pdf.
71 IRPA, supra note 43.
69

70

72

Id.

Rudolph, supra note 54.
Library of Congress, supra note 70, at 148.
7 Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Final Text of the Safe Third-Country Agreement,
availableat http://www.cic.gc.ca/ENGLISH/department/laws-policy/safe-third.asp [hereinafter STC Agreement].
7
74
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programs, and share the responsibility of providing protection to those in
need."76 The submission of dual refugee claims to both countries had been
cited as a drain on the resources of both countries, hampering their ability to
adequately evaluate all claimants.7 This agreement was more important to
Canada than to the United States, as the flow of immigrants entering the
United States from Canada and claiming asylum is quite small, while the
number of refugee and asylum claims made by those entering Canada from
the United States is substantial.
In the joint "first year" review of the Safe Third Country Agreement issued by both governments, it was stated that:
[T]he implementation of the Agreement [was] positive. Since
the Agreement came into force, asylum seekers have been provided with access to a full and fair refugee status determination
process in one country or the other. Implementation of the
Agreement has been in full compliance with international refugee protection principles and in accordance with international
human rights instruments. By establishing clear and consistent
criteria for the allocation of responsibility for adjudicating asylum applications, Canada and the United States have instituted an
effective mechanism to share responsibility for providing protection to refugees in North America. Both governments are effectively adjudicating exceptions. By putting in place an orderly
process, the Agreement has served to reduce the potential for
misuse. Reduction of the potential for misuse should strengthen
public confidence in the integrity of asylum systems in both
countries. 8
While there are a number of significant divergences in immigration and
refugee policy between Canada and the United States, in addition to strong
skepticism of Canadian procedures by United States officials and observers,
the cooperation demonstrated through the Safe Third Country Agreement is
an excellent example of the potential for convergence on immigration policy
issues between the two nations. Even if not achieving a comprehensive
North American security perimeter, the alignment of these policies will help
CIC, A Partnership for Protection - Year One Review, Nov. 16, 2006,
http://www.cic.gc.ca/English/department/laws-policy/partnership/index.asp (last visited Sept.
1,2010).
7 Vincenzo Cuifo, ContinentalSecurity in the Aftermath of 9/11: Re-Evaluating the North
American Perimeter,68 (May 2003) (unpublished M.A. thesis, The University of Guelph,
Ontario) availableat http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk4/etd/MQ80160.pdf
78 STC Agreement, supra note 75.
76
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elevate the need for further thickening of the border prefaced on simple mistrust of a neighbor's policies.
2. Visitors, Temporary Entrants, and Visa Waiver Countries
The admission and monitoring of tourists, international students, business
people, and other temporary entrants or visitors is often cited as the weakest
link in immigration and border security.79 One observer offered the following comparison between entry as a visitor, and entry as an immigrant or refugee:
Entry into either country as a refugee or asylee involves interviews, fingerprints, photographs, hearings, background checks
and possible lengthy detention. The applicant being processed
for permanent-resident status through a Canadian visa office
abroad must wait between one and seven years for paper screening, medicals and security and criminal record checks to be completed before arriving in Canada. Similar waits face the applicant for a United States green card. It is becoming less likely
that future terrorists will subject themselves to this kind of scrutiny and delay, particularly when there are easier options for entry. For those who require visitor visas, the average designated
time for a consular officer to examine and assess an application
can be measured in minutes; the average interview with a visaexempt traveler arriving at a Canadian or United States airport or
land crossing can be measured in seconds.so
The Smart Border Declaration contained a commitment to "initiate joint
review of respective visa waiver lists and share look-out lists at visa issuing
offices"; 8 ' however, the list of countries with visa waiver exceptions is grossly uneven, with Canada granting waivers to nationals of sixty-five countries,
while the United States grants waivers to only thirty-six countries.82 (See
Table 2).

Rekai, supra note 21, at 15.
id.
Smart Border Action Declaration, supra note 21.
82 See U.S. Dep't of State, Visa Waiver Program, http://travel.state.gov/visa/temp/without/
without_1990.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2010); CIC, Visitor Visa Exemptions,
http://www.cic.gc.ca/EnGLish/visit/visas.asp (last visited Sept. 1, 2010).
7
80
81
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TABLE 2:
Visa Exempt Countries, 200983
Canada
Visitor Visa
ExemDtions
Andorra
Anguilla*
Antigua and Barbuda
Australia
Austria
Bahamas
Barbados
Belgium
Bermuda*
Botswana

United States
Visa Waiver
Proaram
Andorra

Australia
Austria

Belgium

Canada
Visitor Visa
Exemotions

United States
Visa Waiver
Proaram

Latvia (Republic of)
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Malta
Mexico
Monaco
Montserrat*

Latvia (Republic of)
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Malta
Monaco

Namibia

Netherlands

Netherlands

British Virgin
New Zealand
New Zealand
Islands*
Norway
Norway
Brunci
Branei
Papua New Guinea
Cayman Islands*
Pitcairn*
Croatia
Poland
Czech Republic
Czech Republic
Portugal
Portugal
Cyprus
St. Helena*
Denmark
Denmark
St. Kitts and Nevis
Estonia
Estonia
St. Lucia
Falkland Islands*
St. Vincent
Finland
Finland
San Marino
San Marino
France
France
Singapore
Singapore
Gibraltar*
Slovakia
Slovakia
Germany
Germany
Slovenia
Slovenia
Greece
Solomon Islands
Holy See
Spain
Spain
Hong Kong
Swaziland
Hungary
Hungary
Sweden
Sweden
Iceland
Iceland
Ireland
Switzerland
Ireland
Switzerland
Turks and Caicos
Israel (National
Islands*
Passport holders)
United Kingdom
Italy
United Kingdom
Italy
Western Samoa
Japan
Japan
Korea (Republic of)
Korea (Republic of)
*Citizens of British dependent territories who derive their citizenship through birth, descent, registration or naturalization in one of the British dependent territories.
*Persons holding a British National (Overseas) Passport issued by the Government of the United
Kingdom to persons born, naturalized or registered in Hong Kong.
tPersons holding a valid and subsisting Special Administrative Region passport issued by the Go vernment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China.
83

Id.
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Within a security perimeter agreement, the list of visa exempt countries is
one issue that must be harmonized. After September 11, Congress considered the idea of eliminating the Visa Waiver Program in its entirety. Therefore, it is unlikely to expect that the United States will readily consider expanding its list to encompass those countries afforded exemptions when traveling to Canada.8 Many of the discrepancies are due to Canada's colonial
ties to the British Commonwealth, and some commentators do not believe
that it would be politically feasible for Canada to require visas of fellow
Commonwealth members or the rich Hong Kong Chinese investors that it
recruited to immigrate in the 1990s. 85
3. Travel Document Requirements
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA)
required the Departments of Homeland Security and State to develop and
implement a plan to require all travelers (including United States citizens) to
present a passport or other secure document or combination of documents
that denotes identity and citizenships when entering or re-entering the United
States. 86 Specifically, this new regulation was applied to North American
Travelers (including Canadian and Caribbean citizens), who had previously
not been subject to a passport requirement. Now known as the Western
Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI), this directive was implemented separately for air-travel and land-travel. Since January 23, 2007, a passport (or
other approved document, such as a NEXUS card) has been required for all
passengers, including Canadians, traveling by air into the United States. As
of June 1, 2009, WHTI also requires such documentation for passengers arriving by land or sea.
Canada has not yet adopted similar requirements for North American
travelers, allowing alternate documents to be used for establishing citizenship
(such as a birth certificate).88 However, as the WHTI applies to United
States citizens, this has effectively imposed a passport requirement for all
United States citizens traveling to Canada, as they are required to show their
passport upon their return to the United States. Apart from visa waiver
lists, 8 9 Canadian and United States documentation requirements for the entry
Koslowski, supra note 11, at 543.
id.
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458 § 7209
(2004).
87 See Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, http://www.getyouhome.gov
(last visited
Sept. 1, 2010) (describing the WHTI requirements).
8 See Canadian Border Services Agency, "Safety and Security - Admissibility," available
at http://www.cbsa-asfe.gc.ca/security-securite/admiss-eng.html.
89 See Visa Waiver Program, supra note 82 (discussing visa waiver
list discrepancies);
84
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of non-North American citizens are quite similar: generally requiring a passport and a temporary entrant visa for admittance.90 Harmonizing these documentation requirements would likely present little difficulty. The passport
requirement for Canadian and United States citizens crossing the shared border would by definition be removed. The two governments would have to
resolve the issue of whether a passport would be required for Canadian and
United States citizens returning to North America from third-countries.
However, because the great majority of these countries require a passport for
entry, this would not impose any significant burden on returning travelers,
and consequently the issue could likely be easily resolved.
4. The Cuba Problem
Canada and the United States have extremely divergent policies towards
the island nation of Cuba. Since the early 1960s, United States-Cuban relations have been severely limited by the broad embargo imposed by President
Eisenhower, which was reinforced by President Kennedy in 1964.91 This
embargo prohibits virtually all commerce with Cuba, including the moving
of financial assets, trade of goods and services, and non-approved travel by
United States citizens.92 The embargo was strengthened in 1996 by the
Helms-Burton Act, which applied the embargo extraterritorially to foreign
companies trading with Cuba. 9 3 In stark contrast to the policies of the United
States, Canada imposes no restrictions on travel or commerce with Cuba,
and, to the contrary, enjoys a strong relationship with the island: several Canadian Prime Ministers had close relationships with former Cuban President
Fidel Castro, and Cuba is a top tourist destination for Canadian travelers.
These divergent policies would have to be resolved in a perimeter agreement; from an immigration standpoint, it would be extremely difficult to
maintain a travel embargo for United States citizens while numerous vacation flights to Havana are available daily from Canadian cities. In April
2009, President Barack Obama signaled the start of a stark shift in United
States-Cuban policy, which may begin to resolve this divergence in policy.
At the 2009 Summit of the Americas meeting, President Obama stated that
"the United States seeks a new beginning with Cuba," and signaled his willingness to engage the Castro Government on a wide array of issues.94 The
Visitor Visa Exemptions, supra note 82 (also discussing visa waiver list discrepancies).
90 See CBSA, supra note 88.
91 Digna B. French, Economic Sanctions Imposed by the United States Against Cuba, 7 U.
MIAMIINT'L & Comp. L. REv. 1, 2 (1999).
92 Id.
9 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996 (Helms-Burton Act),
22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-6091 (2000).
94 Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Alexei Barrionuevo, Obama Says U.S. Will Pursue Thaw With

de Eyre-The Prospectsfor a North American Security Perimeter

197

previous week, Obama lifted travel and economic restrictions for CubanAmericans,95 and his administration has initiated informal meetings between
the State Department and Cuban diplomats in the United States, with the
intention of opening formal talks on issues of migration, drug trafficking, and
regional security matters.96 These steps point towards an eventual convergence of United States and Canadian polices on Cuba; within a perimeter
agreement, it now seems likely that the United States would soften its stance
on Cuba so as to more closely reflect the Canadian approach.
B. A POSSIBLE MODEL: THE EUROPEAN SCHENGEN
AGREEMENT
In the 1980s, the European Union established its own security perimeter,
known as the Schengen Area (named after the town in Luxembourg where
the original agreement was signed).97 The first agreement, enacted in 1985,
was between five countries: France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, and
the Netherlands." This was supplanted in 1990 by the broader Schengen
Acquis ("Schengen Agreement"), which came into effect in 1995 across most
of the European Union. 99 The Schengen Agreement abolished checks at internal borders of the signatory states, creating a single external border where
immigration checks were performed in accordance with jointly-established
procedures. 00 Rules regarding visas, right of asylum, and checks at external
borders were harmonized to permit the free movement of persons within the
signatory states. 01
The Schengen Agreement has been cited as a model for a possible North
American security perimeter.10 2 In Europe in the 1980s, countries were facCuba, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2009, at Al.
9s See Press Release, The White House, Memorandum for the Secretary of State, The
Secretary of the Treasury, The Secretary of Commerce: Promoting Democracy and Human
Rights in Cuba (Apr. 13, 2009), availableat http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepressoffice/
Memorandum-Promoting-Democracy-and-Human-Rights-in-Cuba/ (discussing how easing
travel and economic restrictions for Cuban-Americans facilitates greater contact between
se arated family members and increases the flow of information to Cuba).
See Ginger Thompson, U.S. Plans Informal Meetings With Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27,
2009, at A9.
9 See European Union, Activities of the European Union - Summaries of Legislation, The
Schengen area and cooperation, http://europa.eu/legislation summaries/
justice freedom security/free_movement of persons asylum immigration/133020_en.htm
(last visited Sept. 1, 2010) [hereinafter Schengen Summary].
98

Id.

9 Id.
1oo Id.
101 Id
102 See Frederic J. Moll, The Legal & TechnologicalAdvantage ofa North American Security Perimeter in the War againstTerrorism: How the implementation ofa Schengen-type
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ing many of the same issues confronting the Canada-United States relationship today: extensive back-ups at land crossings for trucks and personal vehicles and complicated passport and visa requirements for tourists.'0o Envisioning the application of the European system in North America, Frank
McMahon of the Fraser Institute wrote, "[i]magine the boost to Canadian
business if goods could move across the Canada-U.S. border as quickly as
they can the German-French border. Imagine the convenience for individual
Canadians crossing the border."' The impact of such a broad system would
indeed provide an exceptional boost to trade and tourism across the CanadaUnited States border; however, the dynamics of this relationship differ in
many ways from that in Europe. It is important to closely analyze the specifics of the Schengen Agreement, specifically with regard to immigration and
refugee procedures, to determine its applicability in the North American context.
In addition to the aforementioned abolition of checks at common borders
and the establishment of uniform procedures for those arriving at external
borders, the Schengen Agreement implemented the following measures:
harmonization of the conditions of entry and visas for short stays; the development of rules governing the responsibility for examining applications from
asylum seekers; the introduction of cross-border rights and surveillance and
hot pursuit for police forces; the establishment of a faster extradition system;
and the creation of the Schengen Information System (a computer system
linking the police stations of member countries).os
1. Visa Harmonization
The harmonization of visa policies is the accomplishment of Schengen
most applicable to the prospect of a North American security perimeter. The
Schengen Agreement sets forth that "[t]he contracting parties undertake to
adopt a common policy on the movement of persons, and, in particular, on
the arrangement for visas. They shall assist each other to that end. The contracting parties undertake to pursue through common consent the harmonization of their policies on visas."o 6 The agreement goes further in establishing
system will best serve the security interests of the United States and Canada, 2004 SYRACUSE
Sci. & TECH. L. REP. 2 (2004).
103 See Koslowski, supra note 11, at
541.
'0 Frank McMahon, PerimeterPuzzle, FRASER FORUM, Dec. 2001, http://oldfraser.lexi.net/
publications/forum/2001/12/section_13.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2010).
1os Schengen Summary, supra note 97.
106

COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE SCHENGEN ACQUIS, INTEGRATED INTO THE

(1999), Title II, Ch. 3, § 1, art. 9, cl. 1, availableat
www.consilium.europa.euluedocs/cmsUpload/SCH.ACQUIS-EN.pdf [hereinafter Schengen
Acquis].
EUROPEAN UNION,
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a "uniform visa valid for the entire territory of the contracting parties."10 7
The Member States have adopted a standard list of countries whose nationals
do not require a visa to enter the Schengen Area based on similar considerations used by Canada or the United States in their respective "visa waiver"
lists: migratory flows, security threats, and established international relations. 08 The principles for issuing the Schengen Visa are that (1) no third
country national can have access to the Union territory if he or she constitutes a risk to the security of any Member State; (2) there is an assumption of
admissibility regarding an individual in possession of a short-term visa delivered by one of the other participating States; and (3) once within the common
territory, the individual is allowed to travel in the whole territory for a threemonth period without any additional control at the internal borders of the
participating states. 0 9 In North America, such commitments would require
both Canada and the United States to yield a considerable amount of sovereignty in order to align their visa waiver policies." 0 Nevertheless, the ability
of the European Union Member Nations to agree upon a common waiver list,
particularly between those nations of opposing Cold War factions, is proof
that compromise is possible.
2. Asylum Claims
The Schengen Agreement also established common guidelines for accepting and processing applications for asylum. The Agreement states that "[t]he
contracting parties undertake to process any application for asylum lodged by
an alien within any one of their territories," but contains an exception that
this obligation "shall not bind a contracting party to authorizing all asylum
seekers to enter or remain within its territory.""' Thus, Member Parties retain the right to establish their own criteria for evaluating asylum claims,
while agreeing to a common application procedure. They are bound to "respecting the finality and the objectives of the Geneva Convention,"ll 2 and
have agreed on a set of principles similar to the Safe Third Country Agreement between Canada and the United States." 3 Only one Member Party may

107
108

Id. art. 10, cl. 1.
Elspeth Guild, The Legal Framework: Who is Entitledto Move? in CONTROLLING

FRONTIERS: FREE MOVEMENT INTO AND wiTIN EUROPE 14, 18 (Didier Bigo & Elspeth Guild

eds., Ashgate 2005).
109 Didier Bigo & Elspeth Guild, Policingat a Distance:Schengen Visa Policies, in
CONTROLLING FRONTIERS: FREE MOVEMENT INTO AND WITHIN EUROPE 233, 238-40 (Didier

Bigo & Elspeth Guild eds., Ashgate 2005).
"o See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing disparities in visa waiver policies).
" Schengen Acquis, supra note 106, at Ch. 7, § 2, art. 29, cl. 1-2.
12 Id. art. 28.
113 See supra Part III.A. 1 (discussing refugee and immigration policies).
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be responsible for an asylum application, and agreed upon criteria are used to
determine which country is responsible"' 4 (note that in the Safe Third Country Agreement, this would generally be determined by the place of landing)." 5
While the framework used in the Schengen Agreement may be applicable
in the North American context, it does not address the divisive issue in North
American refugee and asylum policies: Canada's (lack of) tracking and/or
detainment of claimants after they have landed and deportation procedures
for those deemed inadmissible. The asylum framework in the Schengen
Agreement would do little to appease American concerns over the security
threat posed by some claimants.
3. Policina and Enforcement
In the area of police cooperation and enforcement, the Schengen Agreement sets forth a number of procedures that allow for effective cross border
enforcement with only minimal infringement on the sovereignty of Member
Parties. The Members "undertake to ensure that their police authorities shall,
in compliance with national law and within the scope of their powers, assist
each other for the purposes of preventing and detecting criminal offenses."ll16
Provisions are included to allow the cross-border surveillance of a criminal
suspect involved with certain crimes (generally what would be considered a
felony in the United States)" 7 when appropriate requests are made to the
foreign state's police force."'s Officers conducting cross-border surveillance
are allowed to carry their service weapons for use in "case of legitimate selfdefense," but are prohibited from entering private homes or businesses, and
do not have arrest powers.1 9 Specific provisions are included that waive the
approval requirements in cases of hot pursuit, allowing the originating police
force to carry a pursuit across a border until the local authorities are able to
intercept and carry on the chase.12 0
The law enforcement protocols established in the Schengen Agreement
could be used as guidance in establishing a formal cross-border policing
agreement between Canada and the United States, or as an expansion of the
Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBET) and Shiprider programs al-

114

Schengen Acquis, supra note 106, at Ch. 7, §2, art. 29, cl. 3; Ch. 7, §2, art. 30, cl. 1 (a)-

(g).
115
116
118

STC Agreement, supra note 75.
Schengen Acquis, supra note 106, at Title III, Ch. 1, art. 39. cl. 1.
Id. art. 40, cl. 7.

...Id. art. 40, cl. 1.
"9 Id. art. 40, cl. 3(d)-(f).
120 Id. art. 41, cl.
1.
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ready in operation across North America. 121 There are, however, significant
legal and constitutional obstacles to be overcome in both countries before a
similar agreement could be implemented between Canada and the United
States. An example of the political volatility of these issues was evident by
the breakdown of talks in 2007 over the United States land preclearance project in Fort Erie, Ontario. Officials from Canada and the United States were
unable to commit to an agreement on numerous issues relating to the law
enforcement authority of the United States Customs and Border Protection
officers, including arrest authority, mutually agreeable fingerprinting processes, the sharing of information, and the applicability of the Charter to
United States officers. 122 It is important to note, however, that the parties
were able to reach an agreement regarding the arming of United States officers, as the Canadian government had recently implemented plans to begin
arming Canadian border officers. 12 3 The divisive issue for the United States
was the subordination of United States law enforcement personnel and authorities to Canadian law, while Canada refused to cede to United States demands for fingerprinting abilities.12 4 While this failure is demonstrative of
the challenges facing cross-border law enforcement in North America, the
success of programs such as IBET and Shiprider may lead to an alternate
approach to implement a Schengen-style cross-border enforcement agreement.
The Schengen Agreement and its success in Europe give some credence
to the proponents of adopting a similar system in North America. However,
while the European Union may serve as a model for a North American security perimeter, the geographical, economic, and political dynamics of North
America, and the position of the United States within the continent and
throughout the world create a starkly different relationship dynamic than
those found in the European Union. The United States acts as a global and
continental hegemon; within the European countries, no one country is so
dominant that the rest of the continent has to do business with it on its
terms.12 5

See discussion infra Part HI.C.2.
Gov't Accountability Office, Various Issues Led to the Termination of the United StatesCanada SharedBorder ManagementPilot Project, Sept. 4, 2008, at 4, availableat
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d081038r.pdf.
121
122

'

Id. at 9.

Nicholas Kralev, Pre-Clearancefor U.S. Border Travel Rejected, WASH. TIMES, Apr.
27, 2007, at A13.
125 Perrin Beatty, Canada in North America: Isolation orIntegration?,in THE FUTuRE OF
124

NORTH AMERICAN INTEGRATION 31, 52 (Peter Hakim & Robert E. Litan, eds., Brookings
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C. OTHER POLITICAL AND PRACTICAL IMPEDIMENTS TO
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NORTH AMERICAN PERIMETER
In addition to divergent immigration and refugee policies, additional practical and political obstacles exist which are directly and indirectly related to
immigration and refugee policy concerns within a North American security
perimeter.
1. Sovereignty Concerns
As with most aspects of Canadian-American relations, the issue of sovereignty heavily underlines the debate. Canadian government officials and
academics are extremely sensitive to the power differential that exists in the
Canadian-American relationship; they worry that the United States' role as
regional hegemon creates an expectation that Canada (and other weaker nations) should fall in line with United States interests in terms of security and
border management. 126 The political, military, and economic asymmetry
between the United States and Canada gives Washington significant leverage
to set the policy agenda, with little room left for autonomous policy choices.1 2 7 In this sense, Canada and Mexico have been analogized as "two scared
mice next to a neurotic elephant: they are more worried about the elephant's
reaction to terrorism than terrorism itself. In the effort to pragmatically cope
with this unstable and unpredictable new policy environment, the two mice
are trying to convince the elephant that they are part of the solution rather
than part of the problem." 28
Professor Christopher Rudolph points out that "although neoclassical
economic principles adopted in the contemporary Bretton Woods era have
prompted many 'trading states' to willingly cede some degree of sovereignty
in terms of cross-border flows in order to obtain the economic benefits of
such mobility, this has generally not been applied in the realm of international migration."l29 However, critics have pointed to the absence of any clear
Canadian initiatives or counterproposals for improving border security and
fighting terrorism in North America as evidence that the bilateral cooperation
since September 11 may just be a combination of United States unilateralism
and Canadian submission to the United States agenda."o
While the Canadian government may seem preoccupied with asserting its
sovereignty in negotiations on border and immigration reform, the Canadian
126
127
128
129
130

Rudolph, supra note 54, at 449.
Andreas, supra note 1, at 28-29.
id.
Rudolph, supra note 54, at 449.
id.
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public may not be as sensitive about sovereignty as their leaders are. In a
poll taken shortly after September 11, eighty-five percent of all Canadians
were in favor of "making the types of changes that would be required to create a joint North American security perimeter."13 1 Furthermore, eighty-one
percent thought that Canada and the United States "should adopt common
entry controls, eliminating differences in the way they treat refugee claimants, illegal immigrants, and undocumented workers." 32 While the hysteria
that followed in the aftermath of September 11 may have influenced these
results, the strong opinions voiced show that the Canadian public is not as
preoccupied as their leaders with the loss of sovereignty that may occur in a
perimeter agreement.
2. Jurisdictional and Enforcement Issues
Should a North American security perimeter become a reality, part of the
agreement will have to include guidelines establishing the powers of law
enforcement authorities in the foreign jurisdiction. Protocols for arrest powers, search powers, surveillance, as well as extradition would be necessary,
lest one country become a safe-haven for crimes committed in the other.
There are currently-existing models for how this could work, most notably
the Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBET) 133 and the Shiprider program. 134 The IBETs are multi-faceted law enforcement teams comprised of
both Canadian and United States officials from the Royal Canadian Mounted
Police (RCMP), Canada Border Services Agency, United States Customs and
Border Protection/Office of Border Patrol, United States Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the United States Coast Guard (USCG).
The Shiprider program is a joint program between the RCMP and the USCG,
which places armed officers from both countries on one vessel, allowing
them to seamlessly cross shared waters, remaining fully empowered to enforce the law. This program was run as a two-month pilot project in August
and September of 2007, and was made permanent in March 2008.135

.' Andr6 Picard, Most want PMto Cede Sovereignty Over Border,GLOBE & MAIL (Can.),
Oct. 1, 2001, at Al.
132

id

See Government of Canada, Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBETs),
http://www.canadainternational.gc.calsanfrancisco/bilatcan/ibets-eipf.aspx?lang=eng (last
visited Sept. 1, 2010).
134 Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Cross-border policing and the "shiprider" program,
httj://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/gazette/vol70nl/partnr-eng.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2010).
s Library of Parliament, Canada and the United States: Joint Counter-Terrorism Initiatives, http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/library/PRBpubs/prb0834_10-e.htm (last visited Sept.
1,2010).
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"Coordination and Information Sharing in the Enforcement of [the stated]
Objectives" was one of the four main pillars of the Smart Border Declaration. 136 Included under this heading were plans to do the following: expand
IBET; strengthen existing cross-border crime forums and Project North Star,
a drug interdiction program started in the 1980s; establish joint teams to analyze intelligence; and implement a joint RCMP-Federal Bureau of Investigation fingerprint database. In a perimeter agreement, these existing crossborder enforcement arrangements could be used as the blue print in establishing a force, comprised of United States and Canadian law enforcement officers, tasked with the specific objective of apprehending criminals seeking
shelter in the neighboring country.
3. Domestic Policies
There are numerous areas of domestic policy that are starkly different in
the United States and Canada. To identify and analyze each of these would
be an exhaustive undertaking; thus, for the purpose of this article, several
policies will be considered to provide an illustrative example of the types of
challenges presented. One such issue is the death penalty. In the United
States, thirty-six states may sentence criminals to death (leaving fourteen
states without the death penalty).' 3 7 Conversely, Canada abolished the death
penalty in 1976.138 While each country would still be free to set its own policies for punishment within a North American security perimeter, the issue of
extradition on capital offense would have to be resolved. In 2001, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the extradition of individuals to foreign
jurisdictions where they could be subject to the death penalty was in violation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.139 Based on this interpretation of the Charter, if an integrated enforcement team was to be created
within a security perimeter to apprehend fugitives seeking shelter in either
Canada or the United States,14 0 there would have to be an agreement prohibiting the extradition of United States fugitives who would face the death penalty. However, the establishment of such an agreement would no doubt serve
as a great incentive to United States fugitives to "hide out" in Canada, particularly if there would be no inspection to stop them from crossing the border.
Another area of diverging domestic policy is the issue of same-sex marriage. While Canada recognizes a right to same-sex marriage at the federal
Smart Border Action Declaration, supra note 12.
Death Penalty Information Center, Death Penalty Policy by State,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/'death-penalty-policy-state (last visited Sept. 1, 2010).
United States v. Bums, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283, 295 (Can.).
'39 Id. at 285-286.
'4
See supraPart IHl.C.2 (discussing jurisdictional and enforcement issues).
136
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level,141 the United. States, through its Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA"),
expressly prohibits such recognition for the purposes of federal law. 142 The
Canadian Human Rights Act prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation,14 3 a statutory protection that does not exist at the federal level in the
United States. Applied to the issue of immigration, the recognition of samesex marriages would have to be resolved in order to establish common family
immigration classifications, particularly with regard to the sponsoring and
admission of spouses, parents, or domestic partners.
Currently, two major concerns at the Canada-United States border are
drugs moving into the United States from Canada, and guns coming into
Canada from the United States.'" Each country perceives their neighbor's
policy to be an impermissibly lenient reversal of their own: the notion being
that Canada is soft on drugs, while the United States is soft on guns. There
is, of course, no simple solution to this issue in general, let alone in regards
to a security perimeter. The removal of a checkpoint at the border to screen
for suspicious smugglers may only worsen the flow of contraband in each
direction. Even without mandatory inspections for every traveler crossing
the border, each government would retain the right to conduct selective spot
checks on suspicious vehicles or travelers. Furthermore, the police on both
sides of the border would still have the right to search these vehicles at any
point after their crossing, if allowed under their criminal law. The volatility
of this issue may nevertheless serve as a major impediment to pursuing a
perimeter agreement, as government leaders will be hesitant to support a
measure that may severely limit their ability to control the flow of guns or
drugs into their respective country.
PART IV: CONCLUSION
To face the current and real threat of terrorism in North America and, in
particular, against the United States, an array of options exists. At the extremes of this spectrum, there are two choices: the first is a unilateral fortification and hardening of United States border defenses, with security trumping all other considerations, including trade and migration.145 The other option, as discussed in this note, is the bilateral harmonization and coordination
of sovereignty and government institutions to create a North American security perimeter, similar to the Schengen system in the European Union.146
See Civil Marriage Act, 2005 S.C., ch. 33 (Can.).
Defense of Marriage Act § 3, 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000).
143 Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C. 1985, ch. H-6, § 5 (1977).
See generally, Public Safety Canada, Canada-Untied States Cross Border Crime Forum,
14
http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/le/oc/cbc-eng.aspx (last visited Sept. 1,2010).
145 See Andreas, supra note 1, at 14-15.
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In March and April of 2009, United States Department of Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano began to publicly address the issue of the
Canadian border, giving some insight as to where the Obama administration
intends to direct its border policy. Delivering the keynote address at a conference sponsored by the Brookings Institution entitled Toward a Better Border: The United States and Canada, Secretary Napolitano surprised many
onlookers by making the following comments:
[O]ne of the things that I think we need to be sensitive to is the
very real feeling among the southern border states and on Mexico, that if things are being done on the Mexican border, they
should also be done on the Canadian border. That we . . .
shouldn't go light on one and heavy on the other. [T]his is one
NAFTA, it's one area, it's one continent, and there should be

some parity there.14 7
These comments concerned many observers of Canada-United States border issues, as it was perceived as a policy shift towards the further thickening
of the border to match the protocols currently in place at the Mexico-United
States border, which faces disparate problems in terms of violence, drugs,
and illegal immigration. Asked to clarify her comments in a subsequent interview, Secretary Napolitano stated that "Canada is not Mexico, it doesn't
have a drug war going on, it didn't have 6,000 homicides that were drugrelated last year. Nonetheless, to the extent that terrorists have come into our
country or suspected or known terrorists have entered our country across a
border, it's been across the Canadian border. There are real issues there." 48
These comments indicate that Secretary Napolitano and the Obama Administration do not envision moving towards a North American security perimeter in the foreseeable future. In her comments to the Brookings Institution, Napolitano stated that "there are very real [differences] in immigration
and visa procedures. And those differences are important because it means
we are not dealing in direct parallel terms between Canada and the United
States about who and what is entering. And that, of course, is a security concern." 49

147 Janet Napolitano, U.S. Sec'y of Homeland Security, Keynote Address at the Brookings
Institution Conference, Toward a Better Border: The United States and Canada (Mar. 25,
2009) availableat http://www.brookings.edul-/media/Files/events/2009/0325
us canada/20090325 canada transcript.pdf, at 297 [hereinafter Napolitano].
Interview with US. Homeland Security SecretaryJanetNapolitano, CBC NEWS, Apr.
20, 2009, availableat http://www.cbc.ca/canadalstory/2009/04/20/f-transcript-napolitanomacdonald-interview.html.
149 Napolitano, supra note 147, at 292.
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Secretary Napolitano's statements demonstrate a belief by the Obama
administration that Canadian immigration and refugee policies pose a security threat to the United States, and, as a result, those statements have largely
chilled the prospects of a North American security perimeter becoming a
reality in the immediate future. Both nations have spent billions since September 11 on border and security infrastructure, an indication that physical
inspections at the shared border will likely continue for the foreseeable future. If common immigration and refugee policies and a customs union are
ever to become a reality, a major political shift must occur soon, and immediate efforts made to begin the onerous task of harmonizing the often diverging immigration policies of the two nations.

